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The Great Depression of the 1930s spawned, and continues to spawn, a vast literature
aimed at explaining its birth (conventionally dated from the Wall Street Crash of October, 1929)
and, perhaps even more importantly, why it lasted so long. The rationale for this obsessive
concern amongst economists and commentators is the near-universal belief that it has
important lessons to teach; central bankers like Ben Bernanke study the 1930ʼs so avidly in the
firm conviction that, whether or not the Depression could have been averted, there is no
question but that it was aggravated by policy mistakes that prevented an effective cure from
being found far more quickly ‒ hence, to take just one example, the level of criticism aimed at
the Federal Reserve for deciding to abandon monetary easing in the early summer of 1930
(Ahamed, 2009, p. 366). The (unverifiable) conviction that a decade of economic misery and
political extremism culminating in a world war was (to a large extent, anyway) avoidable,
combined with an assumption that all economic downturns are, at root, the same animal, has
made it an article of faith that even if the wild horses of the apocalypse will never be candidates
for extinction, they can, with experienced handling, be broken in and rendered reasonably
tame.
Yet the economic ebbing that was, and in all probability still is, the Great Recession (which
first came to the popular notice in the shape of the ʻLehman shockʼ of September 2008, though
the tide had in fact turned as early as December 2007 ) seems to suggest that, to date, the
correct conclusions from past experience have either yet to be drawn or, having been drawn,
have simply been ignored this time around. Robert Hetzel, for example, is certain that
ʻ contractionary money policy turned a moderate recession into a severe recession in the
summer of 2008…[when] the Fed, along with other central banks, recreated the stop phase of
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the stop-go monetary era by failing to lower the funds rate in response to sustained weakening
in economic activity ʼ (2012, pp. 214, 216 ). Others, by contrast, are just as certain that the
authorities have made a bad situation far worse by their actions rather than their passivity; the
levees hastily put together in the aftermath of Lehman to hold back the waters of the downturn
in the U.S., Europe and China are seen by alarmists like Peter Schiff (2012) as merely having
created the conditions for a second, and much more devastating, crash to come ‒ the ʻperfect
stormʼ now being forecast by Dr. Nouriel Roubini for 2013.
Even some of those with a residual belief in the potential efficacy of policy note that the
defences erected in 2008 are today much less secure, and that the arms that should be working
to reinforce them have grown weary. According to one leading British commentator, Ambrose
Evans-Pritchard (2012), even the ʻFederal Reserve has drifted into fatalism, seeming to lose
confidence in its own ability to shape events, displaying the same lack of “Rooseveltian resolve”
as the Fed in the early 1930s…ʼ. On this view, the malaise is set to continue; there is no early end
in sight, the world having run out of answers and its will to seek fresh ones becoming ever
more enfeebled. The temptation grows to confess that no quick or effective fixes exist, that we
are between a rock and a hard place, things having spun beyond our control, and that time will
simply have to be allowed to do its work, even if this means that things will get worse, perhaps
much worse, before they get better.
All such defeatist talk is but a red rag to the bulldozer that is Professor Paul Krugman,
winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize for Economics. For him, there is no question but that the
current downturn can be cured, nor any doubt that the process of recovery can be swift and
easy - and in End This Depression Now! he undertakes to explain, in relatively simple terms
accessible to the non-specialist, how all still lies within our power. For someone of his
temperament, this inevitably means excoriating those who disagree with him - the
contemporary “liquidationist” school of Raghuram Rajan and others, for example, whose work
he views as basically an exegesis of the ʻ infamous passage ” in which Joseph Schumpeter
argued that economies can only properly recover from depressions of themselves, and that
well-meaning efforts to accelerate the process by ʻ artificial stimulus ʼ are damagingly
counterproductive (Krugman, pp. 203-205, quotes at p. 204). Professor Krugman will have no
truck whatsoever with the notion of leaving ill alone; the fact that the usual remedies have
failed is for him merely a spur to more radical action. Like any summons to arms, his call seeks
to sound a bracing and encouraging note. But in what guise will the bold knights who are to
come to our rescue appear?
Not, for Professor Krugman, as central bankers, even though he is happy to concede that
such champions still have a role to play (p. 217 ). For he is not a market monetarist, one for
whom quantitative easing á lʼoutrance will save the day. Such tactics, he accepts, work well
enough with run-of-the-mill recessions, but their limitations are cruelly exposed when an
economy is ensnared, as at present, in a liquidity trap (pp. 31-34). So while the Federal Reserve
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does still have work to do, the real burden has now been shifted onto the shoulders of the
Federal Government which, availing itself of the playbook of John Maynard Keynes, must
spend whatever sums of money it takes to replace the loss of demand in the private sector and
so kick-start a recovery. All the evidence, Professor Krugman claims, confirms that ʻchanges in
government spending move output and employment in the same direction: spend more, and
both real GDP and employment will rise; spend less, and both real GDP and employment will
fall ʼ (p. 212 ). For a self-confessed ʻsorta-kinda New Keynesian…[who] often turn[s] to Old
Keynesian ideas…ʼ, a saltwater pragmatist - in his own eyes at least (p. 104) - nothing could be
simpler or more obvious. Government funding alone can do all that is needful to rebuild
demand in the economy by putting money back into the hands of consumers. Opportunities
without number exist for federal initiatives here: it can reemploy the teachers and other public
employees sacked by states and municipalities in the past few years as they have cut their
budgets (pp. 214-215); bring to fruition infrastructure projects, prosaic as well as high-tech (p.
215); offer a program of mass refinancing to those whose are under water with their mortgages
(p. 220-221), and so on, ad paradisum.
But this wonder-working government largesse ‒ where is it to come from? Professor
Krugman does not dwell overlong on specifics here, being far more concerned to extol the
virtuous nature of public spending, and too involved in dismantling the arguments of those who
disagree with him on the point, to delve into too much detail. Tax increases, except for the
ultra-wealthy perhaps, would not appear to be on the agenda; apart from their adverse impact
on demand, they are not politically realistic given the current attitude of U.S. voters. That
leaves only borrowing ‒ which, for Professor Krugman himself, is not really a problem. Yet, as
he freely acknowledges, debt is the subject which dominates thinking everywhere today, and it
is the ground on which the battle of economic ideas will be fought to its conclusion. What he has
to say on the subject, then, is key to whether his cry for action will be heeded.
First and last, he must, of course, avoid at all costs having the placard of irresponsible
spendthrift hung around his neck. So he is quick to fend it off with a rhetorical question;
shouldnʼt we, he asks, ʻbe concerned about the burden of debt weʼre leaving for the future?ʼThe
answer is more rhetorical still; not a definite “Maybe”, but a ʻdefinite “Yes, but.”ʼ
Yes, debt we run up now, as we try to cope with the aftermath of a financial crisis, will place
a burden on the future. But the burden is a lot smaller than the heated rhetoric of deficit hawks
suggests.
The key thing to bear in mind is that the $5 trillion or so in debt America has run up since
the crisis began, and the trillions more weʼll surely run up before this economic siege is over,
wonʼt have to be paid off quickly, or indeed at all (p. 141)
Good news indeed, but persistent devils remain to be exorcised from the detail, where we
find that two important preconditions must be satisfied before entry into the Promised Land is
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ours. Firstly there will need to be a return to growth, which will bring down the ratio of debt to
GDP to an acceptable level; and. in the second place, enough inflation must be engineered over
time to erode the value of the debt, again to render it serviceable - Professor Krugman is
certain that the inflation target should be raised above the current 2% p.a., though his preferred
figure varies (on p. 217 it is 3-4%, while on pp. 162-163 we advance to 4-5%). All which begs the
questions, ʻWhy not 6% or higher?ʼ, ʻAre lenders really so blind as not to notice they will be
short-changed? ʼ, and ʻWill they not rush for the inflation-proof bonds whose existence
Professor Krugman notes? ʼ. Nonetheless, providing his two prerequisites are satisfied,
Professor Krugman is confident that all shall be well and all manner of things shall be well.
There is no gainsaying that it is a beguiling vision of the future ‒ but can it realistically be
brought to pass that easily? Is debt, on which the world careered to the brink of the abyss,
capable of being harnessed to the process of recovery simply by the power of our faith in its
beneficent possibilities?
To try to reassure the sceptical, Professor Krugman cites the evidence of history,
specifically the tale of U.S. government debt from 1945 through the 1970s (pp. 141-142). Yet the
greenest neophyte in the stock market has read the small print warning that past performance
is no sure guide to the future; that which is now hidden may resolve itself into sunlit uplands, a
jungle replete with every variety of venomous creature, or any terrain in-between. Given the
inherent unpredictability of the next decade and more, Professor Krugman recognizes the
advisability of having a second line of defence. So, shifting his ground, he enjoins trust and
patience on those ʻworried about the long-term budget picture.ʼ In return for their forbearance,
they shall have the action against indebtedness that they crave, but ʻeconomic logic would
seem to suggest that austerity should wait ‒ that there should be plans for longer-term cuts in
spending and tax hikes, but that these cuts and hikes should not take effect until the economy
was strongerʼ (p. 194). Those desperate to shed the kilos now must continue awhile with the
feast of debt ‒ but they can also gnaw on plans and promises in the interim, safe in the
knowledge that, appearances notwithstanding, Professor Krugman is really, in his heart, sound
on debt.
But the hesitant may have still other doubts that need assuaging before they irrevocably
commit themselves, and they will not rest content with academic answers to what are far from
academic questions. Are there genuinely no risks to the prescription being proffered here? Is
inflation really as easily and precisely controllable as the temperature of bathwater? What if
those in receipt of government money use it to pay down debt rather than jack up demand?
What if, despite all assurances, growth does not come roaring back, perhaps because of adverse
developments elsewhere in the world? In essence, then, they are asking whether this
glassblower understands his material and craft well enough to create a crystal ball with
reliably predictive powers, and their right to pose the question is surely undeniable ‒ for if
Professor Krugman has in fact misread the fundamentals of the crisis, then may not the
incurring of yet more debt lead even the U.S. to wake one day and find itself confronting the
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brave new world of sovereign default? Cue Boomerang: The Meltdown Tour.
This, the latest offering from Michael Lewis, is another variation on themes that he has
made his own; the hidden workings of the world of high finance, their malign influence on the
ʻrealʼ economy, and the laughable absurdity of what unfolded once the doors of the merchant
banks were closed, dealing began in one of the most predatory card games in the world, and the
line between illusion and reality dissolved. Having begun the story at company level by laying
bare the sordid inner machinations of Salomon Brothers in the late ʻ 80ʼs (Liarʼs Poker ),
expanded it to the plane of the nation state by chronicling the foulness that permeated the
sub-prime phenomenon in the U.S. (The Big Short), in Boomerang Lewis turns to consider the
global consequences of all this putrefaction, which he feels constitutes the ongoing ʻAct II of the
financial crisis ʼ (p. 213 ). As ever, there is humour aplenty in his descriptions of the absurd
unreality of what passed for received wisdom prior to 2008, but the laughter rings increasingly
hollow now that the stakes have been raised so high.
Boomerang opens with Lewisʼ account of two conversations (one in late 2008, the other in
mid-2011 ) he had with Kyle Bass, the hedge fund manager who rose to prominence by
predicting and profiting from the onset of the Great Recession. In 2008 he had already moved
on to forecasting that the crisis was about to metastasize, to the point that not just banks but
the governments that had stood behind them would lose all financial credibility. By 2011 that
was about to come to pass in Greece, but for Bass the countries about which he believed
investors should really be worried were France, Japan and, yes, the U.S. (p. xvii). His view was
unrelievedly bleak; the events that would bring sovereign collapse to pass had already been set
in train, and their progress could no longer be arrested by human agency - only the manner
and timing of the denouement were still in doubt. It was partly to test this assertion that Lewis
embarked a ʻmeltdown tour ʼ of Iceland, Greece, Ireland and Germany, before landing up in
California to try to establish whether the boomerang of debt launched into the air by the U.S.
would indeed arc back with a vengeance to scythe its economy down.
Much of the story Lewis chooses to tell concerns the different ways in which his four
chosen countries responded to ʻthe eruption of cheap and indiscriminate lending between 2002
and 2008ʼ ( p. 145 ). Icelandic males decided en masse on a bizarre change of career; from
fishermen they transformed themselves overnight into investment bankers and, regardless of
their almost complete lack of the experience or aptitude needed for this new role, proceeded to
behave like denizens of Wall Street. What was little short of an act of mass insanity ended in the
bust of 2008, at which point ʻIceland ʼs 300, 000 citizens found that they bore some kind of
responsibility for $100 billion in banking losses…[and also had] tens of billions of dollars in
personal losses from their own bizarre foreign-currency speculation, and even more from the
85 percent collapse in the Icelandic stock market…[all of which was] so ridiculously out of
proportion that, within weeks of the collapse, a third of the population told pollsters that they
were considering emigrationʼ (pp. 3-4).
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The Greeks, ʻonce the lights went out and they were alone in the dark with a pile of moneyʼ
chose their character-defining route to Armageddon by allowing their government to turn the
public sector, already a byword for inefficiency and corruption, into a machine for waste that is
perhaps unrivalled in that part of Europe which did not disappear behind the Iron Curtain after
1945; its staggering generosity in terms of salaries, age of retirement and pensions has today
made the country an object of vilification throughout much of northern Europe, and Lewis can
find space for only a few of the most egregious examples of its failings (pp. 44-45). Even worse,
though, is the atmosphere of corruption that pervades the entire system, for as Lewis remarks,
ʻWhere waste ends and theft begins almost doesnʼt matter; the one masks and thus enables the
otherʼ (p. 45).
Temptation Irish-style took the guise of a real estate boom. Once it got into full swing,
ʻIreland was building as many new houses a year as the United Kingdom, which had fifteen
times as many people to house…and Irish home prices implied an economic growth rate that
would leave Ireland, in twenty-five years, three times as rich as the United States.ʼ Irish banks
lent to property developers with an abandon perhaps even greater than their counterparts in
Spain, incurring ʻdebts they could never repay, of something like 100 billion euros ʼ (p. 115 ),
money that was ploughed into the construction of dwellings that are completely unsaleable for
the simple reason that ʻThere arenʼt enough people in Ireland to fill the new houses; there were
never enough people in Ireland to fill the new houses...[while] people from outside Ireland, even
those with a genetic link to the place, have no interest in owning houses in Irelandʼ (pp. 121-
122).
Lastly, the Germans. But surely this must be some kind of mistake, for are not the Germans
the very models of prudence and self-discipline, totally averse to risk and speculation? Inside
their own borders, Lewis argues, this is entirely true. But let them loose across those frontiers,
he says, and it is a very different story, as the behaviour of German banks prior to 2008 showed
all too clearly.
They lent money to American subprime borrowers, to Irish real estate barons, to Icelandic
banking tycoons, to do things that no German ever would do. The German losses are still being
toted up, but at last count they stand at $21 billion to Icelandic banks, $100 billion to Irish banks,
$60 billion in various U.S. subprime-backed bonds, and some yet to be determined amount in
Greek bonds. The only financial disaster in the last decade German bankers appear to have
missed was investing with Bernie Madoff…ʼ (p. 146).
Undeniably absurd and deeply comic as this catalogue of ineptitude may be, it has an
importance for our current predicament that is not easily underestimated, because it bears
directly and acutely on the subjects of debt and attitudes to it. The deluge of credit between
2002 and 2008 created a world so illusory, so detached from fundamentals, that the inevitable
return to reality could not be anything other than a searing experience. Prior to the onset of the
Great Recession, debt appeared to hold no dangers, most clearly of all in the property market;
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in an era of ever rising prices, it made nothing but ʻsenseʼ to lend and borrow. Creditors felt
secure since, in the event of a default, repossession and resale would preserve and probably
enhance their capital. Debtors matched them in believing themselves to be immune from
disaster, and fell for the lure of the easy money on offer through home ownership. While today,
with the advantage of hindsight, it appears both astonishing and ludicrous, people did not,
generally speaking, anticipate a crash. As Lewis notes, only 15 or so brave souls were prepared
to bet against sub-prime on a large scale, and they had to endure a profoundly bleak sense of
solitude before their insight was eventually vindicated to the tune of billions of dollars; they had
ʻthe strange and isolating sensation of being the sane man in an insane world and, when they
talked about their experience, sounded as a person might if he had sat alone and in silence in a
small boat and watched the Titanic steam into the icebergʼ (pp. ix-x, quote at p. x).
So when, and to all intents and purposes entirely out of the blue, Lehman arrived to make
the recession a reality for the vast majority, the unmasking proved an enormous shock, one
that turned the world upside down practically overnight. And in the course of that sudden,
brief somersault, people lost their stomach for borrowing; debt (in any form) became toxic, and
its hidden dangers, loss of assets and autonomy, blotted out any thought that it could ever again
be benign. And the Lehman shock has been very slow to fade; the near-instantaneous,
terrifying realization that debt could indeed destroy and that no asset was truly safe (for even
gold was ultimately to be viewed as just another casino commodity ) radically damaged
confidence in the future. The age of austerity began to show itself first at the popular level, in
the domestic economy of everyman and everywoman, where caution, retrenchment, and the
preservation of financial independence became the new watchwords. And sadly for Keynsians
like Professor Krugman, these watchwords hold good for people as voters as well as
consumers.
Much of the story of 2008 and its causes as told by Michael Lewis is one that Professor
Krugman is prepared to accept, but only intellectually, in strictly economic terms, those of a
ʻbubble ʼ and the consequent collapse of consumer demand. He himself argues (p. 51 ) that
peopleʼs thinking is often a prisoner of their language ‒ and, specifically, of their choice of the
wrong metaphors. But he proceeds to fall into exactly the same trap when, in seeking to
convince us (pp. 22-23) that what happened to the economy in 2008 was ʻa relatively minor
malfunctionʼ he talks of “magneto trouble” and a ʻbubbleʼ. Are such metaphors anything like
adequate to capture the full reality of what people experienced in that tumultuous year? For
when, in life, a bubble bursts, this constitutes a single, sharply-defined event that deprives the
world of a little iridescence and leaves it with the faintest sensation of dampness. The analogy
does nothing approaching justice to what people in general went through during and after the
sub-prime phenomenon; for non-economists, what happened was far more akin to the creation
and detonation of a complex arrangement of maliciously contrived booby-trapped explosive
devices. Some of these have already been tripped by particular events, but there is a feeling
that there are others still out there with fuses of varying length in the process of burning. If so,
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defusing them is bound to be a long drawn-out process, and one fraught with danger ‒ a fact
that has been very widely, if sometimes only subconsciously, accepted. On this view, promises
of a quick and easy fix through increased debt are not simply an impossible sell to an audience
that has recently tumbled out of one world of debt-illusion with bruises to show for it so painful
that wild horses will not drag it into another; they also fail to address the nagging unease that
there is more, and unavoidable, pain to come. On this supposition, the most urgent task is not to
begin rebuilding the damage already done by excessive debt, but to sandbag the premises
against explosions to come. And since the mother of all possible bombs is sovereign default in
the U.S., voters there need to be very sure that they are not being asked to bring it upon
themselves by throwing good money after bad.
That this is the chief obstacle to the acceptance of his proposals Professor Krugman
half-recognizes ‒ witness his promise to row back on U.S. debt once the crisis is past. Whether
he proffers this out of genuine regard for principle or as a tactic to persuade does not matter,
for either way the premise that underlies it is still that excessive sovereign debt can indeed be
dangerous. Faced with the prospect that this perception amongst ordinary, sensible folk will
thwart his drive for Keynesian reflation, Professor Krugman does his best to evade the
problem. The easiest escape route is via ad hominem arguments; opposition to his program
thus becomes the work of evil Republicans, out to sabotage a recovery for their own selfish
ends with their ʻBig Lieʼ (pp. 64-66). But even Professor Krugman cannot deny that doubters
exist on his own side of the fence, as his account (p. 192) of the way that the debate slipped from
his control under the Obama administration shows:
…it became all the fashion for respectable people to issue apocalyptic warnings about
imminent disaster if we didn ʼ t move immediately to cut the deficit. Erskine Bowles, the
co-chairman ‒ the Democratic co-chairman! ‒ of a panel that was supposed to deliver a plan for
long-term deficit reduction, testified to Congress in March 2011, a few months after the panel
failed to reach agreement, and warned about a debt crisis any day now...
Clearly, then, Professor Krugman needs to offer reassurance about the deficit, and fast. He
can point to the dangers of trying to reduce it too quickly, and indeed makes great play with
the self-defeating program of the ʻAusteriansʼ in the Eurozone, and possibly in the U.K. too,
who are doing just this and seem to be finding that debt-deflation is an invitation to the vortex.
But this is really beside the point, because proving the Austerians wrong does not
automatically make Professor Krugman right; cutting the deficit too fast may indeed be
counterproductive, but one alternative is to slow the process or simply keep the deficit at
current levels. Yet what Professor Krugman advocates is increasing it, and very sizeably so.
The onus is thus on him to provide guarantees that disaster does not lie that way either, and he
offers Americans not one, but two.
The first is that sovereign default simply cannot, or at least will not, happen in the land of
the free. ʻSo is the United States a default risk, or likely to be seen as one any time soon? History
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suggests not… ʼ (p. 139 ). We are not talking about Greece, after all - and indeed Professor
Krugman is most concerned that we should not ʻHellenizeʼ the story of Europe (p. 187), let alone
that of the U.S. Greece, he assures us, is sui generis (not least, perhaps, because his crusade for
public spending would suffer irreparable damage by being associated with the kind of
profligacy that brought Greece to its present pass). No-one in Europe can be permitted to take
a seat in the same boat. But sovereign default sometimes arrives as single spies rather than in
the battalions that marched into Greece. It can begin at regional level or even lower, rather
than as a full-blown national repudiation of debt. That may well now be happening in Europe,
with Valencia the first brick to detach itself from the Spanish wall, and Sicily the first from the
Italian one. And in the U.S.? Well, as Michael Lewis notes, the equivalent phenomenon may
have already begun to play out at state level in California ( pp. 172-178, 188-191 ) and in
municipalities there like San Jose (pp. 191-199) and Vallejo (pp. 199-203) ‒ a list we can now
update to include Stockton and San Bernadino. Are these but the first dominoes to fall? If that
is at least a possibility, then U.S. sovereign default is perhaps not quite so unthinkable after all,
and Professor Krugman is in need of a fall-back position. It comes in the form of an assertion
that, even if a default were to happen, it would be no catastrophe, for the difficulties involved
could be simply sidestepped.
Governments depend on being able to roll over most of…[their] debt, in effect selling new
bonds to pay off old ones. If for some reason investors should refuse to buy new bonds, even a
basically sovereign government could be forced into default.
Could this happen to the United States? Actually, no ‒ because the Federal Reserve could
and would step in and buy federal debt, in effect printing money to buy federal bills… (p. 183).
But this is a technical solution only. Its effects on inflation, and on relationships with
bondholders like the Peopleʼs Republic of China, will not be airbrushed from the record as easily
as they are here ‒ international creditors and their contracts cannot be treated quite so
cavalierly as Professor Krugman believes is possible in the domestic economy, where there is
apparently:
…an alternative or, better yet, complementary road to recovery: just reduce the debt
directly. Debt, after all, isnʼt a physical object ‒ itʼs a contract, something written on paper and
enforced by the government. So why not rewrite the contracts?
And donʼt say that contracts are sacred, never to be renegotiated. Orderly bankruptcy,
which reduces debts when they simply cannot be paid, is a long-established part of our
economic system… (pp. 126-127).
It is a long-established part of the international system too, but that does not of itself make
it any the more advisable. It is not that the U.S., if menaced by default, will necessarily find itself
playing host to a troika as the Irish or the Greeks have done in the recent past. But other ways
may be found to inflict international humiliation and loss of autonomy on a country; it would be
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foolhardy to wave away the dangers of offending a creditor nation like China. And this is
another thing of which voters are not unaware; they know from the experience of their own
lives that the consequences of excessive debt leading to default are serious, and proof of this is
still present to their eyes in communities where foreclosure is not yet a thing of the past. Nor is
there any great willingness to follow Professor Krugman in distinguishing between the public
and private spheres, between the vice of personal debt and the virtue of the sovereign variety.
Truth here is indivisible for the majority, which means that Keynesian reflation is close to an
impossible sell to those who have returned not long since from a near-debt experience and who
have not the least appetite for a close encounter of a second kind. This, then, is the giant and
immovable rock that awaits Professor Krugmanʼs ship at the bottom of the slipway.
He knows it is there, but emotionally he cannot afford to recognise or sympathize with the
quality of the reconnection with reality brought about by the Lehman shock, since this spells
doom for his advocacy of a vast expansion of public debt today; the consumers who
experienced that shock are also voters, and for them the toxicity of debt is still a reality. He can
try to overcome their reluctance by stoking the fires of public anger over unemployment,
writing with all that he can command in the way of eloquence about the wasteful, bitter reality
facing those who have little prospect of finding work (e.g. pp. 6-12 ). But for the foreseeable
future, fear and the memory of a chastening will trump anger, and there will be no broad
constituency of voters demanding a massive campaign of federal spending ‒ which means that
for those seeking public office, advocating that path is seen as leading only to electoral
annihilation. The voters and politicians whom Professor Krugman needs to turn his vision into
reality are, therefore, as much a figment of the imagination as the illusions of prosperity that
seduced the world between 2002 and 2008.
(Professor at Reitaku University)
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